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rAbstract
Using CPS data from 1979–2009 we examine how cyclical downturns and
industry-specific demand shocks affect wage differentials between white
non-Hispanic men and women, Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites, and
African-Americans and non-Hispanic whites. Women’s relative earnings are harmed
by negative shocks; the wage disadvantage of African-Americans drops with
negative shocks, while the impact on Hispanics’ wages is unclear. A theory of job
search suggests two opposite-signed mechanisms that affect these wage
differentials. It suggests greater absolute effects among job-movers, which is verified
using the longitudinal component of the CPS.
Jel codes: J7, E3
Keywords: Wage discrimination; Business cycles1. Introduction and history
For nearly 50 years the measurement of wage differentials between racial and ethnic
groups, and between genders, has been a mainstay of empirical labor economics.
Nearly all of the empirical work has implicitly been grounded in Becker’s (1957)
taste-based approach; and almost the entire oeuvre has either measured cross-
section differentials or considered trends in these differences, which we, following
the literature, refer to throughout as “discriminatory.” Relative to the attention paid
to cross-section differences and trends in wage effects, remarkably little attention
has been paid to how these differentials vary with the extent of labor-market tight-
ness. The issue was mentioned only in passing in the first Handbook survey (Cain,
1986) and was not even alluded to in subsequent Handbook surveys (Altonji and
Blank, 1999; Fryer 2011).
A few studies from the 1970s and 1980s did attempt to measure the cyclicality of dis-
criminatory wage differentials (Ashenfelter, 1970; Freeman, 1973; O’Neill, 1985), analyzing
aggregate time series of the ratio of annual earnings of disadvantaged compared to other
workers. Measured cyclical movements in ratios of earnings per hour could arise from
two distinct mechanisms: changes over the cycle in the characteristics of the workers in
each group (composition effects) and changes over the cycle in pure wage discrimination.
The authors recognized this and pointed to both mechanisms as reasons for expecting
cyclicality in measured discriminatory wage gaps. Discussions of composition effects
pointed to the greater “vulnerability” of women and minorities to cycle-related job loss,
but also noted the tendency for women and minorities to be employed in more stable, al-
beit lower-wage, industries. Both O’Neill and Freeman concluded that composition effects2013 Biddle and Hamermesh; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
eproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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man and Ashenfelter offered reasons for suspecting that true wage discrimination would
also be counter-cyclical, with the latter referring to an apparently common argument of
the time that the perceived cost to employers of discriminating was higher in tight labor
markets. But neither found empirical evidence of cyclical movements in pure wage dis-
crimination in the aggregate data.
Since the mid-1990s, despite the continuing volatility of aggregate and local labor
markets, including the turmoil caused by the Great Recession, almost no attention has
been given to the relationship between labor market tightness and discriminatory wage
differentials. Numerous studies have used the CPS and other individual level data sets
to study longer-term movements in discriminatory wage differentials, but with almost
no mention made of the possible cyclicality of such differentials1.
This neglect seems unfortunate for policy purposes: We know the implications and
concerns for the prospects of different demographic groups’ employment as aggregate
demand changes: Blacks and Hispanics’ employment is more volatile than that of
whites, while men’s employment has been more volatile than women’s, especially dur-
ing the Great Recession. But knowing how the relative prices of an hour of workers’
time vary over the cycle across these different race/ethnicity gender groups, after ac-
counting for other characteristics, is just as important. Total earnings, adjusted for un-
changing personal characteristics that affect earnings, is a crucial input into measuring
well-being and its cyclical variation. Careful measurement of cyclical changes in relative
wages is thus an essential step in inferring the path of cyclical changes in the relative
well-being of different groups.
In this study we provide this measurement. In the next section we document the paths
of wage differentials by gender (female/male), ethnicity (Hispanic/non-Hispanic) and race
(black/white), using the Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups
(CPS-MORG) from 1979 through 2009. This is a sufficiently long period to cover four (or
five, if one considers the early 1980s recessions as distinct) aggregate cycles. Since the
CPS-MORG files provide individual level data with industry and geographic identifiers,
we can measure more accurately the labor market environment facing each worker; and
the longitudinal component of the CPS-MORG data allows us to distinguish changes in
measured wage differentials due to changes in pure wage discrimination from those due
to composition effects, both observable and unobservable.
We find that the male–female wage gap is counter-cyclical, that is, the wage dis-
advantage faced by women grows when and where unemployment is temporarily
higher. This does not appear to be due to a composition effect, but rather to
changes in pure wage discrimination. The measured discriminatory gap for
African-Americans, on the other hand, is pro-cyclical, but this is partly the result
of composition effects. The cyclical behavior of the wage disadvantage faced by
Hispanics is unclear. Section 3 sets out a search-theoretic model of discrimination
to aid in interpreting the evidence. We show that a standard random search model
with employer discrimination implies a cost to employers of indulging discriminatory
tastes that varies pro-cyclically, thus providing a formal version of the argument cited in
early work; but the model also points to other ways that discriminatory wage differentials
will be affected by a changing unemployment-vacancy ratio that work in the opposite
direction. One implication of this model, that economic fluctuations will change
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enced by job-changers, is supported in the data.
2. Data and evidence—Current Population Survey, 1979–2009
2.1 Basic estimates
Throughout this section we use the Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rota-
tion Groups beginning 1979, the first year for which they are available. We proxy wages
by reported usual weekly earnings but adjust weekly earnings by including a quadratic
in usual weekly hours among the independent variables. We divide the working popula-
tion into four exhaustive and mutually exclusive groups, non-Hispanic white males,
non-Hispanic white females, non-black Hispanics, and African-Americans, and create
indicator variables M for the last three groups2. In addition, except in the initial esti-
mates we adjust wages by holding constant for a wide range of CPS covariates, X, in-
cluding a vector of indicators of educational attainment, a quadratic in potential
experience, and indicators of marital status, metropolitan location, veteran status and
private/public sector employment3. The samples are restricted to civilian wage and sal-
ary workers—the self-employed are excluded, as are members of the armed forces.
For each year we calculate the unemployment rate U in each state and use that as the
state-specific cyclical indicator4. We thus estimate:
Wist ¼ α1Mist þ α2Ust þ α3MistUst þ βXist þ νs þ τt þ εist; ð1Þ
where i denotes an individual, s a state and t a year, and W is the logarithm of weekly earn-
ings. The νs and τt are state and year fixed effects respectively. While we initially estimate
(1) without either of these vectors, and then include only the year fixed effects, to save spaceTable 1 Coefficient estimates describing in (usual weekly earnings) and state
unemployment rates, CPS-MORG, 1979–2009, all workers*
Nonhispanic Whites,
females relative to males
Nonblack Hispanics
(relative to Nonhispanic Whites)
Blacks (relative to
Nonhispanic Whites)
M −0.0764 −0.0717 −0.2086 −0.1902 −0.1453 −0.1523
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0026) (0.0026)
M × Married −0.1546 −0.1548
(0.0011) (0.0011)
U** 0.8104 0.5062 0.3453 −0.0580 0.3722 0.0532
(0.0220) (0.0277) (0.0180) (0.0242) (0.0178) (0.0239)
M × U −0.8744 −0.9163 0.6360 −0.0280 0.1098 0.3660
(0.0254) (0.0252) (0.0512) (0.0516) (0.0394) (0.0395)
Fixed effects:
State x x x
Year x x x x x x
Adj. R2 0.698 0.704 0.689 0.694 0.693 0.698
N = 4,343,280 4,734,522 4,829,326
Average effect of
M (log points)
−0.223 −0.221 −0.170 −0.192 −0.139 −0.130
*Each equation includes a vector of indicators of educational attainment, quadratics in usual hours and potential
experience, and indicators of marital status, metropolitan location, veteran status and private/public sector employment.
The equations also include an inter-action of gender and marital status, and those in Columns 3–6 include a main effect
of gender. Robust standard errors in parentheses below the parameter estimates here and in Tables 2, 3 and 4.
**Measured as a fraction here and in subsequent tables.
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(although Table 1 also reports results excluding the vector of state fixed effects).
We report results for three different samples. The first includes only non-Hispanic
whites, with Mi equaling one for females and the estimates of α1 + α3U denoting the
wage differential between women and men among non-Hispanic whites. The second
sample consists of non-Hispanic whites and non-black Hispanics, with Mi equaling
one for non-black Hispanic workers and α1 + α3U measuring the wage differential
between them and non-Hispanic whites. The third consists of non-Hispanic whites
and African-Americans, with Mi equaling one for African Americans and α1 + α3U
measuring the wage differential between non-Hispanic whites and African-
Americans. The coefficients on U listed in the Table treat unemployment as a frac-
tion of the labor force.
When we estimate (1) with the vector of state fixed effects we are implicitly adding
a focus on temporary variations in the tightness of state labor markets to the cyclical
variation in economy-wide labor market tightness. This specification accounts for
the possibility that in certain states unemployment may be above or below the na-
tional average in most or all years (although Marston, 1985, suggests not). Such
long-term differences are arguably related to wage differences (e.g., Hall, 1970, but
going back to Smith, 1776). When we estimate (1) including the vector of year fixed
effects, we are implicitly abstracting from aggregate cycles. Adding both state and
year fixed effects to the regression reduces the precision in our estimates of the im-
pact of changes in unemployment on discriminatory wage differentials, but alleviates
bias caused by correlations between secular changes in the natural rate of unemploy-
ment, real wages, and the presence of women and minorities in the labor force.
Before turning to the estimates of (1), we focus on the effect of the cycle on these
wage differentials absent any demographic controls, year or state fixed effects, control-
ling only for hours worked and a time trend. Without any controls we estimate that
white women’s wages relative to white men’s fall by 1.2 percent with each one
percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate. Non-black Hispanics’ wages rise
relative to non-Hispanic whites’ wages by 0.9 percent in response to the same rise in
unemployment, and African-Americans’ wages similarly rise by 0.3 percentage points.
Even without any adjustments it is clear that no single pattern characterizes cyclical
changes in “discriminatory” wage differentials5.
Table 1 contains the main results of the estimated equations that include the “minor-
ity” indicators. We show only the main effect of the indicator, the main effect of the
state unemployment rate, and their interactions—the parameters αj, as the estimates of
the β are standard. Consider first the results for women. With a mean state unemploy-
ment rate of 0.0601 over this period, the wage disadvantage of women, other things
equal, averages about 20 percent. The interaction term remains significantly negative—
as the unemployment rate increases the wage disadvantage facing women increases.
This effect is about the same whether or not we include state fixed effects. Measured
wage discrimination against females generally is counter-cyclical6.
Considering next the results in Columns (3) and (4) for non-black Hispanics, we see
that generally their wage disadvantage is around 16 percent. The pattern of the His-
panic wage disadvantage is weakly and insignificantly counter-cyclical once we control
for state fixed effects. When these are excluded the interaction term for Hispanics is
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few, high-unemployment states, excluding the vector of state indicators is incorrect.
The final two columns of Table 1 present the results for African-Americans. The
wage disadvantage overall averages about 12 percent. More important, the inter-
action terms are positive and statistically significant whether or not we include state
fixed effects7.
None of these conclusions is changed greatly if the sample is restricted in various
reasonable ways. For example, excluding public-sector employees changes the coeffi-
cients on the interaction terms reported in Columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table 1
to −0.915 (s.e.=0.025), -0.114 (s.e.=0.055) and 0.341 (s.e.=0.045) respectively. Adding
separate trend terms for the nine Census sub-regions to the specifications in the
table generates estimated interactions of −0.912 (s.e.=0.025), -0.056 (s.e.=0.052) and
0.397 (s.e.= 0.040). Finally, excluding the roughly twenty percent of observations
whose reported earnings in the CPS are allocated produces estimated interactions
of −0.804 (s.e.=0.025), 0.073 (s.e.=0.051) and 0.188 (s.e.=0.039)8.
Another concern is that, even with state and year fixed effects, the estimates of (1)
constrain the effect of minority status on earnings to be the same in all states, which is
inconsistent with numerous findings (going back to Becker, 1957). Also, there may be
differences in attitudes toward minorities across states that are correlated with the mi-
norities’ wage disadvantages. Accordingly, we re-estimate (1) adding state-M interac-
tions. The resulting estimates of α3 are −0.892 (s.e=0.029), 0.528 (s.e.= 0.056) and 0.317
(s.e.=0.043) for women, Hispanics and African-Americans respectively. As with the al-
ternative specifications discussed above, nothing much changes for women and
African-Americans. For Hispanics, on the other hand, the estimate changes drastically,
no doubt because of the very uneven concentrations of Hispanics across states over
much of this period. The change illustrates the difficulty of estimating this effect for
Hispanics.
The impacts of a typical recession vary sharply across gender/race/ethnic groups,
with the biggest effect among women. Based on the estimates in Column (2), for them
an increase of 4.7 percentage-points in average unemployment (which occurred in the
Great Recession) increases their wage disadvantage by over 4 percentage points; among
Hispanics the effect is tiny—an increase in their wage disadvantage of slightly more
than 0.1 percentage points, while among African-Americans this severe a recession re-
duces their wage disadvantage by about 1.7 percentage points.
Whether these effects result from economy-wide cycles or state-specific shocks can be
inferred by re-estimating (1) including interactions of M with indicators for each year,
which eliminates economy-wide fluctuations in unemployment as a source of identifica-
tion, but alleviates potential biases caused by correlations between secular changes in the
natural rate of unemployment and secular changes in attitudes towards women and mi-
norities.. The estimates of the α3 become −0.289 (s.e.=0.036), -1.777 (s.e.=0.083) and 0.292
(s.e.=0.059) for women, Hispanics and African-Americans respectively. These differ sub-
stantially from those reported in Table 1. The estimate for women is in the same direction
as the estimate in Table 1, and is still statistically significant, but it indicates that common
aggregate cycles have larger negative impacts on the female wage disadvantage than do
idiosyncratic state-specific cycles. For Hispanics, the estimates continue to suggest how
dependent the inference is on the particular specification, while for African-Americans
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wage disadvantage.2.2 Extensions
The results thus far have been based on samples covering thirty-one years. Given the
documented changes in the labor markets for members of all three “minorities,” per-
haps the extent of cyclical variation in their wages over this period changed too. To
examine this possibility we first divide the entire sample period into two parts, 1979–
92 and 1993–2009 (each thus comprising two aggregate business cycles) and re-
estimate the equations.
The estimates over these two sub-periods are shown in Table 2. Among women the
results in the earlier sub-period are the same as before—apparently increasing discrim-
ination as unemployment increases; but in the later sub-period the results reverse, with
apparent discrimination falling as unemployment increases. Among Hispanics the esti-
mates are consistent with those in Table 1, and perhaps even stronger, showing that the
wage disadvantage increases as unemployment increases. Among African-Americans
the estimates suggest a roughly similar conclusion as those for the entire time period—
that the wage disadvantage declines when the unemployment rate rises—although the
relationship in the latter sub-period is weak.Table 2 Coefficient estimates describing in (usual weekly earnings), CPS-MORG,
sub-periods 1979–1992, 1993–2009, all workers*
Nonhispanic Whites,
females relative to males
Nonblack Hispanics
(relative to Nonhispanic Whites)
Blacks
(relative to Nonhispanic Whites)
1979-1992
M −0.1003 −0.1788 −0.1335
(0.0025) (0.0062) (0.0037)
M × Married −0.1904
(0.0015)
U 0.3094 −0.0338 0.0033
(0.0358) (0.0316) (0.0312)
M ×U −0.6225 −0.1786 0.1390
(0.0312) (0.0868) (0.0492)
Adj. R2 0.711 0.705 0.707
N 2,149,100 2,284,349 2,379,640
1993-2009
M −0.1369 −0.1405 −0.1320
(0.0029) (0.0041) (0.0043)
M × Married −0.1265
(0.0016)
U −0.3778 −0.2695 −0.1998
(0.0585) (0.0499) (0.0503)
M × U 0.2755 −0.4342 0.0475
(0.0510) (0.0704) (0.0770)
Adj. R2 0.638 0.631 0.631
N 2,194,180 2,450,173 2,449,686
*Same variables as in Table 1. State and year fixed effects in each equation.
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could arise from both cyclicality in pure wage discrimination and from unemployment-
related changes in the unobservable characteristics of the sample of employed workers—a
composition effect in the unobservables. Using the short longitudinal structure of the
CPS-MORG we can examine the co-movement of unemployment rates and discrimin-
atory wage differentials in a group of workers of constant unobservable composition. This
analysis thus controls for possible interactions between a wide range of unobservable indi-
vidual characteristics and the state-specific unemployment rate.
Table 3 presents the results of regressions in which the sample is restricted to obser-
vations that had positive earnings in both months 4 and 8 (one year apart) of their par-
ticipation in the CPS and which include person fixed effects, so that state fixed effects
are implicit in the estimation9. We present estimates for the entire sample period and
then separately for the two sub-periods10. Essentially we difference (1) so that the
dependent variable is the change in log-earnings, and the only independent variables
are the change in the state unemployment rate, its interaction with M, linear terms in
experience and current and year-lagged weekly hours, and year fixed effects.
The results for women are unambiguous—for the whole sample and the two sub-
periods the wage disadvantage of women grows when and where unemployment is tem-
porarily higher, just as it did in all the various alternative specifications of (1). Thus, the
positive relationship between the unemployment rate and the wage disadvantage faced byTable 3 Coefficient estimates describing Δin (usual weekly earnings), CPS-MORG, 1980–
2009 and sub-periods 1980–1992, 1993–2009, all workers, based on longitudinal data*
Nonhispanic Whites,
females relative to males
Nonblack Hispanics
(relative to Nonhispanic Whites)
Blacks
(relative to Nonhispanic Whites)
1980-2009
ΔU 0.1482 −0.0573 −0.0267
(0.0780) (0.0653) (0.0650)
M × ΔU −0.3856 −0.2855 0.1373
(0.0854) (0.1447) (0.1361)
Adj. R2 0.286 0.281 0.280
N 1,375,689 1,493,368 1,524,422
1980-1992
ΔU 0.0196 −0.0992 −0.0736
(0.0850) (0.0730) (0.0719)
M × ΔU −0.1796 −0.5640 0.2733
(0.0887) (0.1967) (0.1490)
Adj. R2 0.351 0.349 0.347
N 641,724 679,107 708,584
1993-2009
ΔU 0.2837 −0.0038 0.0256
(0.1349) (0.1114) (0.1122)
M × ΔU −0.5620 −0.2000 0.0456
(0.1372) (0.1816) (0.2051)
Adj. R2 0.252 0.248 0.246
N 733,965 814,261 815,838
*Also includes potential experience and current and past year’s usual weekly hours, and year fixed effects.
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shows that the apparent reversal of sign of the relationship between unemployment and
the male–female wage gap during the latter half of the sample period was due to a change
in the impact of unobservable, unemployment-related composition effects on the mea-
sured gap rather than a change in the cyclicality of wage discrimination. This latter obser-
vation is consistent with Mulligan and Rubinstein’s (2008) finding that the nature of
selection into the female labor force changed between the 1970s and the 1990s, which
may have resulted in changing selectivity over the cycle as well.
The estimates also show that the relatively weak positive relationship between un-
employment and the wage disadvantage facing Hispanics in the cross-section becomes
considerably stronger when composition effects arising from unobservables are re-
moved. Hispanic workers who keep their jobs as unemployment rises implicitly have
increasingly more desirable unobservable characteristics than do non-Hispanic white
workers who keep their jobs. One possible but non-testable explanation for this fact is
that a weaker labor market impinges particularly on the employment prospects of un-
documented workers, whose English-language skills, which we cannot measure in the
CPS, make their wages lower than those of observationally identical Hispanics. The
positive co-movement of the relative wages of African-Americans and unemployment
that we saw in Table 1 diminishes in magnitude and becomes insignificant when mea-
sured in this sample with unchanging unobservable composition.
While we have carefully accounted for labor-market-wide effects, treating states as
labor markets, we have ignored the job-specific impacts of changes in demand. The
question is whether, given the state’s labor market, the impact of job-specific shocks
mirrors that of a labor-market-wide shock. To examine this we re-specify (1) as:
Wist ¼ α1Mist þ α2Ust þ α3MistUst þ α4ΔHit þ α5ΔHitMist þ α6ΔHitUstþ
þα7ΔHitMistUst þ βXist þþνs þ τt þ εist; ð2Þ
where ΔHit is the percentage change in total person-hours worked in the CPS industry
between years t-1 and t.
We present estimates of the αj in (2) in Table 4 for equations with the three specifica-
tions of the indicator M. Unemployment is treated as fractional, as before, as is ΔHit.
The estimates are trimmed to remove industry/year observations in which the calcula-
tions from the CPS implied an absolute annual change in total person-hours of at least
50 percent. This amounts to deleting 2.3 percent of the industry-year observations, but
only 0.1 percent of the individuals in the 1980–2009 samples (as the extreme fluctua-
tions in industry person-hours are due to small sample sizes in a few industries)11.
The estimates of ∂2W/∂M∂U at the average ΔH differ only very slightly from the esti-
mates in Table 1 (not surprisingly, given the lack of correlation between state un-
employment rates and annual changes in economy-wide industry hours worked)12.
Thus accounting for industry-specific changes in employment does not alter the con-
clusion that the female wage disadvantage increases as unemployment rises, that the
African-American wage disadvantage falls, and that conclusions about the Hispanic dis-
advantage are ambiguous.
To answer whether industry-specific shocks affect gender/racial/ethnic wage differen-
tials in the same way as market-wide shocks, we focus on the estimates of ∂2W/
∂M∂ΔH at the averages of U, shown at the bottom of Table 4. Among women we
Table 4 CPS-MORG, all workers 1980–2009, accounting for industry cyclicality, trimmed
estimates*
Nonhispanic Whites,
females relative to males
Nonblack Hispanics
(relative to Nonhispanic Whites)
Blacks
(relative to Nonhispanic Whites)
M −0.0700 −0.1980
(0.0018) (0.0033) (0.0027)
M × Married −0.1507
(0.0011)
M × U −0.9221 0.0995 0.3869
(0.0255) (0.0524) (0.0399)
ΔH 0.0533 0.0796 0.0694
(0.0120) (0.0096) (0.0096)
ΔH*U −2.022 −2.306 −2.215
(0.159) (0.127) (0.127)
ΔH*M 0.0336 0.4534 −0.0650
(0.0181) (0.0367) (0.0288)
ΔH*M*U 0.523 −3.695 1.077
(0.248) (0.536) (0.389)
Adj. R2 0.700 0.689 0.693






*Includes the state and year fixed effects and the same variables as in Table 1. Trimmed to exclude observations with an
absolute annual change in industry employment ≥ 50 percent.
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that we observed for cyclical labor-market rises in unemployment in Table 1—as ΔH is
more negative, women’s wages fall relative to men’s. Among Hispanics too the generally
negative impacts of rising unemployment shown above are mirrored by the negative ef-
fects on their relative wages of negative industry demand shocks. Only among African-
Americans is there no impact of industry demand shocks.
A fair conclusion is that for women the effects of industry-specific shocks are in the
same directions as those of cyclical, market-wide shocks—in both cases increasing slack
increases women’s wage disadvantage. The impact of changes in industry demand is
not so large, however: Even a decline in average industry employment equaling the dif-
ference between the smallest (most negative) and the largest in the sample period
would increase white women’s wage disadvantage by 1.8 percent points—less than half
of the increase occurring in a deep recession. The effect of a rise in industry demand is
larger among Hispanics and, as with women, suggests a small increasing disadvantage
as demand slackens.3. Modeling discrimination over the cycle
The previous sections have presented compelling evidence that discriminatory wage
gaps are related to labor market tightness, at least for women and African-Americans,
a relationship that shows up even in analyses of co-movements of wage and
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problem, however, is that the direction of the effects differs among “minority”
groups. In this section we outline an equilibrium search model that provides insights
into why pure wage discrimination might be related to labor market tightness, a
model that builds on the work of Black (1995) and Rosén (2003), and why this rela-
tionship might differ among groups. It contains two types of workers, one of which is
subject to employer discrimination in the labor market. The model explores the intu-
ition that the rising ratio of job seekers to vacancies during a recession might give
employers more scope to indulge discriminatory tastes, while bringing to light other
ways that cyclical fluctuations might affect discriminatory wage differentials. We
present enough of the model to make clear the key mechanisms.
There are two types of worker, type A and type B. Type A workers are favored and
account for a fraction λ of job seekers. Workers search randomly across vacancies of-
fered by employers. Each potential vacancy is associated with a value of the discrim-
ination coefficient c, which is distributed across vacancies over a range from zero to
cmax. A vacancy’s discrimination coefficient manifests itself as a tax on the employer
who hires a type B worker into the vacancy, but it may influence the wage paid to a
type A worker hired into that vacancy.
Equations (3) and (4) express the value to a worker of type i of being un-
employed (Ui) versus being employed in a position with discrimination coefficient
c (Wi(c)).
rUi ¼ θzi E Wi cð Þð Þ–Ui½ ; i ¼ A;B ð3Þ
rWi cð Þ ¼ Wi cð Þ þ s Ui–Wi cð Þ½  ð4Þ
In (3) r is the discount rate, θ is the rate at which workers receive job offers, zi is
the probability that the employer will be willing to hire the worker of type i, and E
(Wi(c) ) is the expected value, for worker type i, of being employed, where the ex-
pectation is taken over the distribution of c. In (4) s is an exogenous separation rate,
and Wi(c) the wage earned by a type i worker at a job with a discrimination coeffi-
cient of c.
Equations (5) and (6) give the value to the employer of a vacancy and a filled job as
functions of the job’s discrimination coefficient, c.
rV cð Þ ¼ −kþ φy cð Þ E Ji cð Þ–V cð Þð  ð5Þ½
rJi cð Þ ¼ x–Wi cð Þ–ci þ s rV cð Þ–Ji cð Þ½ ; i ¼ A;B ð6Þ
In (5) k is the cost of keeping a vacancy open for a period, φ is the rate at whichworkers arrive at employers, and y(c) is the probability that the randomly arriving
worker will be acceptable to the employer, which depends on the vacancy’s c value. The
expectation in (5) is taken over the distribution of worker types. In (6) x is the value of
a worker’s product, assumed the same for all workers in all jobs, and ci is equal to zero
if a type A worker is hired, and equal to the vacancy’s discrimination coefficient if a
type B worker is hired.
Because it costs to keep a vacancy open, and there is a foregone surplus from a
filled job, the employer offering a vacancy with a non-zero c faces a tradeoff. Hiring a
type B worker has a psychic cost, c, which for some vacancies will be greater than
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waiting for a type A worker to apply generates a cost in terms of k and forgone x that
is proportional to the waiting time.
Following common practice, we assume that, when a worker meets an employer in
the search process, the wage is determined by a Nash bargaining process, which gives
the worker a share β of the surplus. The potential surplus for an i worker and a c va-
cancy is (Wi(c) – Ui) + (Ji(c) – V(c)). Replacing Wi(c) and Ji(c) in this expression with
(4) and (6) yields a wage equation for a type-i worker in a c vacancy:
Wi cð Þ ¼ β x–ci–rV cð Þð Þ þ 1–βð ÞrUi ð7Þ
Equations (5), (6), (7) can be used to derive two possible values for a c-vacancy. LetVAB represent the value of the vacancy if the employer is willing to fill it with either
type of worker, and VA stand for the value of the vacancy if the employer hires only A
type workers. Then:
rVAB cð Þ ¼ −k rþ sð Þ þ 1–βð Þφ x– 1–λð Þc–λrUA– 1–λð ÞrUB½ f g= rþ sþ 1–βð Þφð Þ
ð8aÞ
rVA cð Þ ¼ −k rþ sð Þ þ 1–βð Þφλ x–rUA½ f g= rþ sþ 1–βð Þφλð Þ: ð8bÞ
Whether a vacancy is segregated or integrated depends on which of these values ishigher, and that depends on the value of c. Setting (8a) equal to (8b) gives a cutoff
value c*, such that vacancies for which c>c* will be filled only with A workers:
c ¼ rþ sð Þ kþ xð Þ þ 1–βð Þφλ rUA½ = rþ sþ 1–βð Þφλ½ f g–rUB ð9Þ
A higher c* means less discrimination. A higher cost of waiting (k) or a higher
value of production (x) leads to less discrimination, since the cost of discriminating
is waiting for the next worker to come along if a B worker is denied the job.
Let H(c*) be the probability that c<c*, so that zB, the probability that a vacancy
found by a type B worker will be filled by him, is H(c*), while zA = 1. Then (3) and
(4) and the wage equation (7) yield expressions for the value of search for each type
of worker:
rUA ¼ θβE x–rV cð Þð Þ½ = rþ sþ θβð Þ ð10aÞ
rUB ¼ θβE x–c–rV cð Þ c < cÞH cð Þ= rþ sþ θβH cð Þð Þjð½ ð10bÞ
where the expectations are over the distribution of c. These equations can be used to
show that UA > UB, which, given the wage equation (7), implies that in equilibrium
the B worker receives a lower wage than the A worker at any employer willing to hire
both types13. Also, as VAB is declining in c, wages for both A and B workers fall as c
increases up to c*, at which point there is no wage for B workers and the A wage re-
mains constant.
The arrival rate of workers φ, which is one factor determining the cost to em-
ployers of discrimination, depends on the processes governing the number of
searching workers and the number of vacancies offered. Letting the total number of
workers equal 1, a fraction α of whom are type A, and letting the number
unemployed for type A and type B workers be uA and uB, the change over
time in the number unemployed can be written as duA = s(α – uA) – θuA and duB = s
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steady-state rates of unemployment are given by:
uA ¼ αs= sþ θð Þ ð11aÞ
uB ¼ 1–αð Þs= sþ θH cð Þð Þ: ð11bÞ
Group-specific unemployment rates can be found by dividing (11a) and (11b) by αand (1 – α), respectively, leading to the unsurprising result that the unemployment rate
for B type workers will always be higher than the unemployment rate for A type
workers. Also, λ, the share of unemployed workers who are Type A, will always be
lower than α, the share of type A workers in the economy.
To endogenize the number of vacancies, assume that there are M potential vacancies
that will become actual vacancies if their value is greater than zero. In order to have an
equilibrium in which discriminators can survive long-run entry, we follow Black (1995)
by assuming differences in entrepreneurial ability that are attached to potential em-
ployers. Entrepreneurial ability is represented by a fixed cost that is incurred if a va-
cancy is opened (and persists whether it is filled or not). We represent this cost by the
parameter ε, assumed to be distributed uniformly across vacancies on the interval 0 to
Rε, independent of the discrimination coefficient c, which is also assumed to be distrib-
uted uniformly across potential vacancies. The fixed cost parameter appears as a term
subtracted from the value equations (8a) and (8b).
Potential vacancies will become actual vacancies if:
εj < rVAB cj; c
 
if cj < c
εj < rVA cð Þ if cj > c; ð12Þ
where j indexes vacancies, each of which has an ε value and a c value. The value of va-
cancy equations are function of c* because the value of search Ui, which affects the
value of a vacancy, is a function of c*. The value of a vacancy is a direct function of c
only for employers who integrate. This means that in equilibrium, the number of va-
cancies will be:
v ¼ M= cmaxRεð Þf g
Zc
0





With equations for the number of vacancies and the number of unemployed workerswe can characterize the arrival rates θ and φ. As is common in the literature, we as-
sume a matching function m(uA+uB, v) that describes the number of meetings between
searching workers and vacancies that will occur in a period. Adding the conventional
assumption that the matching function exhibits constant returns to scale allows the
rate at which a searching worker meets a vacancy to be written as:
θ ¼ m uA þ uB; vð Þ= uA þ uBð Þ ¼ m 1; v= uA þ uBð Þð Þ ð14Þ
while the rate at which employers see workers showing up at vacancies is:
φ ¼ m uA þ uB; vð Þ=v ¼ m uA þ uBð Þ=v; 1ð Þ ð15Þ
In the context of this model, we represent macroeconomic fluctuations as changes inx, the value to the firm of a workers’ output. It is possible to differentiate the
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plex and non-transparent expression with an ambiguous sign. The model can, however,
be used to think through the step-by-step impact of a recession on employers, workers,
and market-level variables, thus providing some insight into the sources of this ambigu-
ity and their possible correspondence to real world phenomena.
As discussed above, one cost to discriminating is the opportunity cost of the longer
expected wait until an acceptable worker arrives, and this cost falls with a fall in the
value of output. Employers who might not discriminate when the value of output is
high will do so when it is low. Thus the model captures the idea that discrimination
will be more costly in a tighter labor market. A greater proportion of discriminating
employers in the labor market lowers the bargaining power of type B workers relative
to type A workers, increasing the wage gap.
Another immediate impact of a drop in x, however, serves to increase the bargaining
power of type B workers. Other things equal, the fall in the value of workers’ product
lowers the perceived value of both filled jobs and vacancies, causing some vacancies
and jobs to be eliminated. But the model suggests that, under a wide range of circum-
stances, jobs and vacancies that are closed to type B workers are more likely to dis-
appear. The existence of differing entrepreneurial ability means that there are marginal
positions at every level of c, and these are the positions (filled or vacant) that disappear
when a recession lowers x. There are, however, more infra-marginal positions at lower
values of c. Therefore it will typically be the case that when x falls the proportion of po-
sitions that disappears is greater at higher values of c. This tends to lower the share of
type-A only vacancies, raising the value of search for type B workers, and thus raising
their bargaining power and wages relative to those of A workers.
Figure 1 depicts the nature of the equilibrium and illustrates these two initial and
countervailing effects of a recession. On the axes are ε and c, so that potential vacan-
cies are distributed uniformly over the quadrant. The line labeled V(c) = 0 shows the
dividing line between combinations of c and ε for which vacancies have positive utility
(below the line) and those for which they have negative utility. Positive utility vacancies
with c>c* hire only majority (A) workers; because V(c) declines in c up to c*, some AB
(integrated) vacancies yield a higher surplus than any segregated vacancy. The firstFigure 1 Job openings and employers’ tastes for discrimination.
Biddle and Hamermesh IZA Journal of Labor Policy 2013, 2:7 Page 14 of 19
http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/7impact of a recession is to lower the value of a vacancy (the shift from V(c) to V(c)’ in
the figure) in a way that lowers the level of c*, decreasing the share of positions poten-
tially open to type B workers, and increasing the wage gap. However, as the figure also
shows, the proportion of segregated positions that disappears is larger than the propor-
tion of integrated positions that disappears, as a consequence of the fact that there are
more infra-marginal positions at values of c below c*.
As positions disappear, the rate at which workers arrive at employers rises, but
the rate at which workers find new vacancies drops. As noted above, the higher arrival
rate of workers at vacancies lowers the cost of discriminating, because a faster arrival
of the next worker means less foregone output when a type B worker is turned away14.
This lowers the cutoff value of c*, which in turn lowers the value of search for type B
workers relative to type A workers. A similar effect results from disproportionately
more type A than type B workers losing jobs, raising the share of type A workers
among the searchers and lowering the expected waiting time for the next type A appli-
cant for firms who turn away type B workers. The lower arrival rate of job offers to
workers lowers the value of search for both type A and type B workers, which lowers
the wage of both types; but it lowers the value of search more for type A workers. This
decreases the wage gap, but is a rather subtle, non-intuitive effect, as are the impacts of
the many of the subsequent equilibrating reactions of the model’s variables to the initial
events set in motion by a fall in x.
Although our model leaves open the question of whether discriminatory wage differen-
tials are pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical, it does identify several distinct mechanisms
through which business-cycle fluctuations could plausibly alter discriminatory wage differ-
entials. These include cycle-induced changes in the costs and benefits of discrimination in
hiring and changes in the mix of discriminators vs. non-discriminators in the labor market
caused by entry or exit of firms. In addition, our argument suggests that changes in dis-
criminatory wage differentials accompanying aggregate fluctuations will arise from the im-
pact of these fluctuations on changes in the relative wages of advantaged vs.
disadvantaged workers who leave one job and search for another, not on their impact on
wages of workers continuing in the same job. Indeed, the model predicts that we will ob-
serve these effects for job-changers only, since there is no mechanism in the model
through which wages change for workers who do not change employers.4. Job-movers vs. job-stayers
There is substantial evidence (e.g., Devereux and Hart, 2006) that wages generally are
more procyclical among job-movers than job-stayers. The question suggested by Section 4
is whether gender/ethnic/racial wage differentials are more cyclical (either pro- or coun-
tercyclical) among job-movers than among job-stayers. The short longitudinal structure of
the CPS allows us to answer this question, thus providing a test of the model’s implication
that changes in unemployment affect wage gaps through their impact on the wage
changes experienced by job-changers.
The CPS does not identify employers, so we assume that workers who list the same
small industry of employment in interviews in Years t-1 and t are job-stayers, while
those who list different industries are job-movers. Given evidence of substantial
reporting error in the self-classification of industry affiliation (Freeman, 1984), our test
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since some job-stayers will mistakenly be classified as job-movers. Finally, with losses
of perhaps 1/3 of the CPS observations due to an inability to match across the pair of
years, and other observations dropped because individuals enter or leave employment,
the sample sizes here are smaller than those used in the cross-section analyses in
Section 3 (but, of course, the same as in the analyses reflected in Table 3).
To save space, in Table 5 we present only estimates of the interaction terms ∂2ΔW/
∂M∂U and their standard errors from the equations for job-stayers and –movers,
along with what is essentially the triple difference [∂2ΔW/∂M∂U]MOVER – [∂
2ΔW/
∂M∂U]STAYER. The evidence in the table supports the model’s predictions. The rela-
tionship between labor-market tightness and the wage disadvantage facing women is
significantly greater in the sample of job-movers than in the sample of job-stayers.
Remembering from Table 1 that the wage disadvantage of African-Americans drops
significantly when unemployment rises, the results here suggest that this gain is due
to the behavior of wage changes among job-movers: Among African-Americans the
wage disadvantage becomes smaller among job-movers as unemployment rises, but hardly
varies among job-stayers. Among Hispanics the negative impact of the cycle is, however,
equally pronounced among job-movers and –stayers, again showing the ambiguities in
the estimates of the cyclical variation in this discriminatory differential.
Only for women compared to men are the differences between job-movers and
job-stayers statistically significant. The difference for blacks is large but only statisti-
cally significant at a very low level, while the results for Hispanics at least do not
contradict our interpretation of our theory. Remembering, however, that our method
of distinguishing job-movers and stayers necessarily blurs the distinction between
them, these results do seem somewhat convincing. They suggest that it is through
wage-setting as new employment relations are entered into that the changing market
effects of discrimination become felt. Short-run increases in unemployment have less
effect on wage differentials within continuing jobs.5. Conclusion and implications
We have documented a relationship between measured discriminatory wage differen-
tials and labor market tightness, as indicated by either state unemployment rates orTable 5 Coefficient estimates describing Δin (usual weekly earnings), CPS-MORG,
1980–2009, distinguishing job-movers from job-stayers*
Nonhispanic whites,
females relative to males
Nonblack Hispanics






Movers −0.7519 −0.2714 0.2796
(0.1629) (0.2444) (0.2379)
Stayers −0.0741 −0.3087 0.0374
(0.0904) (0.1675) (0.1561)
Movers-Stayers −0.6778 0.0373 0.2422
(0.1147) (0.2029) (0.1940)
*Same variables as in Table 3.
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the CPS to explore the extent to which this relationship is due to the changing compos-
ition of the labor force as the unemployment rate fluctuates vs. changes in pure wage dis-
crimination. The evidence that a tighter labor market leads to a smaller discriminatory
wage gap is strongest and most robust when comparing male and female wages, and is
observed in samples of unchanging composition. We also find that the measured African-
American-white wage gap increases when the labor market tightens, but this appears to
be due mainly to composition effects. The evidence on pure wage discrimination against
Hispanics is ambiguous, varying depending on the sample and methods chosen15.
In a search model changes in discriminatory wage differences must come through the
wage changes experienced by workers who change jobs, as it includes no mechanism
through which employers alter the wages paid to continuing employees. We do find
that the relationship between changes in the unemployment rate and changes in dis-
criminatory wage differentials is stronger in samples of workers who did change jobs
than in samples of job-stayers. “Discriminatory” wage disadvantages, rising with un-
employment among women and falling among African-Americans, are observed dis-
proportionally in the wage changes experienced by job-movers.
A next step in re-opening this long-neglected area of study might be to use more de-
tailed sets of data to infer the differential roles of the mechanisms that generate cyclical
changes in pure wage discrimination in our model and infer why the net effects differ
among the groups we have studied. One mechanism that leads discriminatory wage gaps
to vary over the cycle is the disproportionate exit of discriminators during a recession,
which tends to narrow such wage gaps by raising the bargaining power of the disadvan-
taged group. This effect is stronger the larger the proportion of non-discriminating em-
ployers. While there is, however, ample evidence that Americans’ attitudes toward
employment discrimination policies differ according to the group being protected
(Strolovich 1998), it is not clear that these differences are evidence of similar differences
in the willingness of employers to discriminate against racial minorities vs. women.
One could also generate differences across groups in the size of the impact of “dis-
proportionate exit” by relaxing the model’s assumption of a zero correlation between
employers’ discriminatory attitudes and “entrepreneurial ability” (which can be seen as
a stand-in for the presence of quasi-rents). The more negative this correlation, the
more the bargaining power of the disadvantaged group will rise during recessions, and
differences across groups in this correlation would lead to differences in the cyclical be-
havior of their wage gaps. Suppose, for example, that firm size is positively correlated
with the presence of quasi-rents. Social scientists from various disciplines have claimed
that the more formal and rule-driven hiring processes of larger firms should lead to less
discrimination in hiring, but the various arguments both for and against this claim
often refer specifically to the case of gender or race discrimination, and the empirical
evidence is mixed (see, e.g., Kay and Gorman (2012), Baron et al. (2007)). Further re-
search on how firm size affects discrimination and whether the effect differs across dis-
advantaged groups might also shed light on differences across group in the cyclicality
of wage discrimination.
Perhaps the most important policy implication of this work stems from our result on
the cyclical variation in the female–male wage gap. This finding suggests that relative
wage variation is in the opposite direction from the well-known lesser cyclicality of
Biddle and Hamermesh IZA Journal of Labor Policy 2013, 2:7 Page 17 of 19
http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/7women’s than of men’s employment probability. It also suggests that gender cyclical
variations in the sources of economic well-being are less pronounced than one might
infer from readily available data on variations in employment.
A similar conclusion can be drawn about differences between African-Americans and
non-Hispanic whites (although the gross effects are in the opposite directions from
those characterizing women and men, and much of the wage effect results from cyclical
changes in labor-force composition). Finally, and perhaps more disturbingly, while the
results on Hispanics are quite mixed, they indicate that the adjusted difference in
Hispanic- and non-Hispanic-white wages does not diminish in recessions. Coupled with
the well-known greater cyclicality of Hispanics’ employment probabilities, this result
suggests that cyclical downturns may create an especially heavy burden on that group.Endnotes
1See, e.g., Blau and Kahn (2006), or Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008). Blanchflower
and Oswald (1995) did relate wages to unemployment rates for separate demographic
groups without comparing cyclical responses. Kuhn and Shen (2013) is a rare exception
to this generalization, although in a very specific context; and Dustmann et al. (2010)
did examine the cyclicality of immigrant-native wage differentials.
2Even for the years 2003–2009, when the CPS offered a large variety of racial charac-
teristics, we code as African-American only those who listed that as their sole racial
identification. For those years this means excluding only 3 percent of those who list
themselves as partly or entirely African-American.
3We have not included a union indicator, since data on union coverage or membership
are only available from 1982 on. To include it we would have had to drop three years of
data, and would have lost one of the four aggregate cycles from this 31-year period.
4We use the same underlying data, the ORG, to calculate state unemployment rates.
Using these data may lead to slight (given the size of the ORG samples) extra measure-
ment error compared to using the entire CPS. In any event, to the extent these errors
exist, they merely mean that we under-estimate the absolute values of the impacts of
interest.
5The estimates are based throughout on equations with observations weighted by the
CPS sampling weights.
6None of the conclusions in this sub-section changes qualitatively if we substitute the
logarithm of the state unemployment rate for the actual rate. The conclusion here is
opposite that in Park and Shin (2005), which used a very short time period, a much
smaller sample, and defined U as aggregate rather than state-specific unemployment.
7Estimating these equations without state or year fixed effects, and substituting a
trend term for the latter, yields estimates of the interaction terms of −0.896 (s.e.=0.003),
0.523 (s.e.=0.051) and 0.058 (s.e.=0.040) for the female, Hispanic and black equations.
8The results are also nearly identical if all four groups—white non-Hispanic males
and females, non-black Hispanics, and African-Americans—are included in one regres-
sion, so that the control variables are constrained to have the same impacts for
every worker.
9This arises because the CPS interviews individuals in particular households, not in
particular families, so that house-movers fall out of the longitudinal sample.
Biddle and Hamermesh IZA Journal of Labor Policy 2013, 2:7 Page 18 of 19
http://www.izajolp.com/content/2/1/710Elsby et al. (2010) used the longitudinal component of the CPS to analyze a related
question, how flows into and out of unemployment vary over the business cycle, with-
out focusing on gender/race/ethnic differences in these responses.
11We spliced the series using the overlapping industry definitions in the 2002 CPS.
12This lack of correlation also means that the estimates of the interaction ΔHitMist in
a re-specified equation that excludes terms in U are almost identical to those presented
in Table 4.
13As in Black (1995) and Rosén (2003), the value of search (U) is lower in equilibrium
among type B workers, because they have a longer expected search time before finding
a vacancy that they can fill. This weakens their bargaining position when they do find
an employer, so they end up with a lower wage.
14Note that if the firm has market power (i.e., faces a downward-sloping demand
curve), this cost of discriminating will be lower, other things equal. This analogous to
Becker’s (1957) argument that lessened product-market competition will generate
greater measured discrimination, a view that has been generally supported by empirical
results (e.g., Ashenfelter and Hannan, 1986).
15The filing of discrimination complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission is countercyclical for all groups, although perhaps because many of the
complaints deal with terminations, which are obviously counteryclical. In a regression
describing total annual filings from 1997 through 2011 and including a trend term, the
total rose by about 4 percent for each 1 percentage-point increase in the aggregate un-
employment rate. Similar responses exist for regressions estimated separately for claims
based on sex, national origin or race, despite our evidence that wage effects by race de-
crease as unemployment increases. (Based on data available at http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/sta-
tistics/enforcement/charges.cfm).
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